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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-THIRD CIRCUIT SETS FORTH BALANCING

TEST FOR EVALUATING Jus TERTII STANDING IN FIRST AMENDMENT
CONTEXT

Amato v. Wilentz (1991)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The range of rights and immunities that a litigant has standing to
assert is limited by the United States Constitution and by traditional
common law principles. Specifically, "in the ordinary course, a litigant
must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a
claim to relief premised on the legal rights or interests of third parties."
Throughout the past several decades, however, the United States
Supreme Court has substantially eroded this bias against third party, or
2
jus tertii, standing.
1. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991); see Gladstone v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (noting that "a litigant normally must assert
an injury that is peculiar to himself or to a distinct group of which he is a part");
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 444 (1972) (recognizing that "a litigant may
assert only his own constitutional rights or immunities") (quoting United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1984) (noting that a litigant may challenge a
statute "only in the terms in which it is applied to him; and, in the application
process, courts have broad power to construe the relevant statutory language so
as to avoid constitutional difficulties"); Marc Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others:
The Troubled Law of Third Party Standing and Mootness in Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI
L.REV. 393, 394 (1981) (noting that "a litigant may not argue that the govern-

mental conduct that causes him harm should be enjoined or declared illegal simply because the conduct infringes on the rights of a third party").
2. Powers, 111 S.Ct. at 1372 (concluding that criminal defendant had standing to raise constitutional rights of juror excluded in voir dire on racial
grounds); United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1990)
(holding that attorney had standing to raise client's constitutional rights relating
to fee restrictions); Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3

(1989) (concluding that attorney had standing to raise constitutional claims of
criminal defendant client); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438
U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (holding that citizens living near site of proposed nuclear
power plant had standing to bring declaratory judgment action); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (finding that vendor had standing to assert rights of
potential vendees seeking access to vendor's market); Planned Parenthood v.

Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (concluding that physicians had standing to
challenge constitutionality of abortion statute); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
117-18 (1976) (holding that physicians had standing to raise constitutional
claims of patients who were denied medical funding for abortions); Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 443-46 (holding that distributor of contraceptives had standing to
raise constitutional rights of unmarried distributees); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (holding that physician and medical clinic had standing
to raise constitutional right of married people to use contraceptives); Rohr, supra
note 1, at 463 (arguing that federal courts should grant third-party standing to
any litigant who appears reasonably likely to give adequate representation to the
interests of the right holder).

(1117)
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In Amato v. Wilentz,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether Essex County, New Jersey
had standing to assert First Amendment rights on behalf of Warner
Brothers, a movie studio that was denied access to county courthouses
to film movie scenes. 4 The Third Circuit denied the county third party
standing to raise claims of violations of the movie studio's First Amendment rights, and dismissed the county's lawsuit. 5 In reaching this con-

clusion, the Third Circuit enunciated the various factors that must be
balanced in evaluatingjus tertii standing cases, and arranged these factors into a cohesive framework to be used when approaching cases
presentingjus tertii standing issues. 6 In doing so, the Third Circuit discussed the uniquejus tertii standing considerations raised in the context
of First Amendment litigation, but concluded that these considerations
did not mandate a finding ofjus tertii standing. 7 The Third Circuit also
addressed federalism concerns raised by the "county versus state nature
of the suit" and ultimately reaffirmed the "federal courts' longstanding
8
reluctance to inject themselves into intrastate-government disputes."
The terms "third party standing" and "jus tertii standing" are used interchangeably in case law and academic commentary. See Valley Forge Christians
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 492-93 n.4 (1982) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (noting that the Court "generally permit[s] persons to press federal suits even when the injury complained of
is not obviously within the realm of injuries that a particular statutory or constitutional provision was designed to guard against" and that this "circumstance
[is] one of 'third-party standing' "); see generally Robert Allen Sedler, Standing to
Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1962)
(using expression "jus tertii standing"); Rohr, supra note 1 at 394 (using expression "third-party standing").
The term 'jus tertii standing" is also used to describe First Amendment
overbreadth standing. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutionaljus Tertii, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 423, 423-44 (1974) [hereinafter Standing]. In differentiating jus tertii
standing from overbreadth standing, commentators have focused on the relationship between the litigant and the third party. Id. at 424. Specifically, in ajus
tertii standing case, the litigant seeks to raise the rights of an existing third party
with whom the litigant has an established relationship. Standing, supra, at 424. In
an overbreadth standing case, by contrast, the litigant is permitted to raise the
claim of a hypothetical third party. Id.
3. 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 743.
5. Id. at 755.
6. Id. at 749-55.
7. Id. at 753-54.
8. Amato, 953 F.2d at 754-55. In Amato, Essex County and the Essex County
Executive brought action against the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, individually and in his capacity as Administrative Head of the New Jersey
Judiciary System. Id. at 743. For discussions of the propriety of federal court
involvement in intrastate-governmental disputes, see Williams v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1932) (holding that municipality, as creation of state, may not invoke constitutional privileges or immunities against its
creator); City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[p]olitical subdivisions of a state may not challenge the validity of a state statute under the Four-
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This Casebrief first surveys the historical development of the concept of jus tertii standing in United States Supreme Court decisions. 9
Next, this Casebrief sets forth the facts precipitating the county's lawsuit
asserting the movie studio's constitutional rights.10 This Casebrief then
examines the Third Circuit's analysis and balancing of the various factors relevant in jus tertii standing cases."I Finally, this Casebrief concludes that the Amato decision provides useful guidance for courts in
2
addressing questions ofjus tertii standing.'
II.

BACKGROUND

The longstanding principle that a litigant only has standing to raise
his or her own rights is deeply rooted in traditional common law. 1 3 The
United States Supreme Court relied on this principle as early as 1900 in
Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration.14 In Tyler, the Court denied

standing, holding that "[t]he prime object of all litigation is to establish
a right asserted by the plaintiff or to sustain a defence set up by the party
pursued."' 15 The Court explained that, except in a few instances, the
plaintiff "is bound to show an interest in the suit personal to himself."' 16
The Supreme Court still adheres to this historical bias against third
party standing.17
This general disfavor of third party standing is not mandated by the
teenth Amendment") (quoting City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923,
929 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039
(1980).
9. For a detailed discussion of the historical development ofjus tertii standing, see infra notes 13-39 and accompanying text.
10. For a full discussion of the facts of Amato, see infra notes 41-53 and
accompanying text.
11. For a detailed discussion of the Amato Court's reasoning and analysis
underlying its holding, see infra notes 54-95 and accompanying text.
12. For a full discussion of the usefulness of the Amato framework, see infra
notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
13. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) ("To
limit the breadth of issues which must be dealt with ... this Court has generally
insisted that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to
themselves."); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) ("Ordinarily, one
may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of
some third party."); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 72 (1917) ("[Alttacks
upon the validity of laws can only be entertained when made by those whose
rights are directly affected by the law or ordinance in question.").
14. 179 U.S. 405 (1900). In Tyler, the plaintiff attempted to challenge the
Land Registration Act of Massachusetts, on the ground that it "deprive[d] persons of property without due process of law." Id. at 409. The Court, however,
held that the plaintiff was not affected by the Act because he had the "requisite
notice," and thus, lacked standing to sue. Id. at 410.
15. Id. at 406, 410.
16. Id. at 406. Four justices dissented on the narrower basis that the litigant showed a sufficient personal interest in the litigation. Id. at 414.
17. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991) ("In the ordinary
course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and can-
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Article III "case and controversy" requirement of the United States
Constitution, but rather is a "prudential limitation" applied by the
Court in addition to constitutional standing requirements.' 8 The bias
against third party standing serves two judicial policies. First, the rule
provides courts with the opportunity to exercise judicial restraint. t 9
Courts may invoke the rule in order to avoid hearing unnecessary and
undesirable cases in which third parties do not wish to assert their
rights. 20 Second, the rule allows courts to avoid ruling on hypothetical
or abstract grievances. 2 1 The theory underlying judicial reluctance to
allow a litigant to vicariously assert the rights of others is that the injured party will be the best advocate for his or her position, and that a
plaintiff may be in a self-interested or even conflicting position to the
22
third party whose rights the plaintiff purports to assert.
The prudential rule against jus tertii standing is not without exceptions. As early as 1915, the Supreme Court began to relax its traditional
not rest a claim to relief premised on the legal rights or interests of third
parties.").
18. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987) (recognizing jus tertii
standing as prudential limitation in addition to constitutional standing requirement); see also Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989)
(referring to jus tertii standing as prudential limitation); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (recognizing that "limitations on a litigant's assertion ofjus
tertii are not constitutionally mandated").
19. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 193 (noting that limitations on third party standing "stem from a salutary 'rule of self-restraint' designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional
questions are ill-defined and speculative"); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255 (1952) ("[T]his Court has developed a... rule of self-restraint for its own
governance.. . which ordinarily precludes a person from challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights of others.").
20. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1975) (noting that
"[c]ourts should not adjudicate [third parties'] rights unnecessarily [because] ...
the holders of those rights [may] . . .not wish to assert them, or will be able to
enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is successful or not").
21. See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984)
(stating that prudential limitations on standing "assure[] the court that the issues before it will be concrete and sharply presented"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 444 (1972) ("[O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons .. .in which its application might be unconstitutional.") (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960)); California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893) (noting that the "duty of
...everyjudicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular case before it"); see also
Rohr, supra note 1 at 396-400 (discussing Supreme Court decisions applying
general rule against jus tertii standing).
22. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114 (opining that "third parties themselves
usually will be the best proponents of their own rights"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962) (noting that standing requirements are aimed at "assur[ing]
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends").
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suspicion of third party standing. For example, in Truax v. Raich,2 3 the
Court permitted an employee to raise the Equal Protection rights of his
employer. 24 Ten years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2 5 schools were
permitted to raise the Fourteenth Amendment rights of prospective
pupils and their parents. 2 6 The Supreme Court did not decide these
early cases based on the modern concept ofjus tertii standing. Rather,
the Court decided these cases based upon the idea that interference with

the rights of third parties directly and immediately impaired the rights of
27

the plaintiffs.
The series of modem cases specifically establishing jus tertii standing as a distinct legal principle began with Barrows v. Jackson in 1953.28
In Barrows, the Court permitted a white vendor to assert the rights of a
black vendee as a defense in a suit charging the vendor with breach of a
23. 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (granting employee standing to challenge statute

based on employer's Equal Protection rights).
24. Id. at 38-39. In Truax, Arizona enacted a statute that was designed "to
protect the citizens of the United States in their employment against non-citizens of the United States, in Arizona." Id. at 35. The statute required employers of more than five workers to employ "not less than eighty (80) per cent
qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States." Id. Subsequent
to the enactment of the statute, the plaintiff, who was not a qualified elector, was
discharged. Id. at 36.
25. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (granting standing to schools to raise Fourteenth

Amendment rights of prospective pupils and their parents).
26. Id. at 535-36; see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (noting
that statute prohibiting teachers from teaching foreign languages interfered with
rights of pupils and their parents); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923)
(same).

In Pierce, the plaintiffs claimed that the Compulsory Education Act of Ore-

gon, which required every parent of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen to send the child "to a public school for the period of time a public school
shall be held during the current year," was a violation of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to liberty. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530.
27. Truax, 239 U.S. at 38-39. In upholding the right of employees to raise
the rights of their employer, the Truax Court adopted a "first party standing"

approach. Id. The Court reasoned that the interference with the employers'
rights "operate[d] directly" on the rights of the employees. Id. at 38. Therefore, the employees' claim could be heard by the Court. Id. at 39. The Pierce
Court adopted the reasoning of Truax. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536. Specifically, the
Court analogized the interrelation of interests between businesses and patrons
to that of schools and pupils. Id. at 536. In granting relief, the Court relied
upon the "many . . . cases where injunctions have issued to protect business
enterprises against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers." Id.
Thus, the Pierce Court reasoned that the schools' interest in the rights of prospective students and their parents was "clear and immediate." Id.
Most of the cases where such challenges were sustained were based upon
the concept of non-severability. The basic concept of non-severability is that a
party has standing to challenge a statute if he or she can show that a statute is
non-severable or that "an attempt to sever would leave standing a statute that
would be incapable of giving fair notice of its prohibitions." Sedler, supra note 2,
at 608. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of non-severability, see
Sedler, supra note 2, at 601-12.
28. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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racially restrictive covenant. 2 9 Barrows was the first case in which the
Supreme Court expressly recognized a litigant's standing to assert the
constitutional rights of third parties. 30 The Barrows court stated that
"[u]nder the peculiar circumstances... the reasons which underlie [the]
rule denying standing to raise another's rights.., are outweighed by the
need to protect the fundamental rights which would be denied."' 3 '
Since the Barrows decision, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized jus tertii standing to be appropriate when the policies underlying
32
the restrictions on such standing are not furthered.
Supreme Court decisions addressing the appropriateness ofjus tertii standing have provided federal courts with guidance in determining
the relevant factors for evaluatingjus tertii standing. 3 3 First, the litigant
must have suffered a concrete, redressable injury in fact. 34 Second, the
court must consider whether prudential considerations should prevent
29. Id. at 257 (stating that "the reasons which underlie our rule denying

standing to raise another's rights... are outweighed by the need to protect the
fundamental rights which would be denied").
30. Id. at 255-59.
31. Id. at 257.
32. See, e.g., Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956
(1984). The Munson Court recognized that in "situations where competing considerations outweigh any prudential rationale against third-party standing ...
[the Supreme Court] has relaxed the prudential-standing limitation." Id. Specifically, the Court noted that "[w]here practical obstacles prevent a party from
asserting rights on behalf of itself, for example, the Court has recognized the
doctrine ofjus tertii standing." Id.; see United States Dept. Labor v. Triplett, 494
U.S. 715, 721 (1990) (holding attorney had jus tertii standing to bring action
based on client who was deprived of legal representation, due to obstacles
preventing client from asserting his own rights); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 114-15 (1976) (holding physicians had third party standing to raise claims
of patients who were denied medical funding for abortions based on obstacles
precluding patients from asserting own rights, while recognizing that the rule
against third party standing "should not be applied where its underlying justifications are absent"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958) (holding that nexus of association was sufficient to give NAACPjus tertii
standing to assert constitutional rights of its members).
, There are also numerous examples wherejus tertii standing is permitted in
order to avoid chilling expression in the First Amendment contexts. See, e.g.,
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (holding that prudential rationale against third party standing was outweighed by society's interest in protecting free speech and
expression).
33. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 626-28. This commentator notes that federal
courts most often assess: 1) the interest of the third party asserting jus tertii
standing; 2) the nature of the right asserted; 3) the relationship between the
party asserting standing and the rightholders; and 4) the feasibility of the
rightholders asserting their own rights in an independent action. Id.; see Standing, supra note 2, at 425.
34. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 n.3 (1989). If
the plaintiff can allege sufficient concrete injury, the Article III case-and-controversy requirement is satisfied. Id.
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the plaintiff from advancing the claim. 3 5 In assessing prudential considerations, the court must examine the following three factors: (1) the relationship between the litigant and the third party; (2) the ability of the
third party to advance his own interests; and (3) the impact of potential
36
litigation by the third party.
The Supreme Court has, however, left undecided the issue of the
exact role these three factors play in evaluating jus tertii standing.3 7 In
some cases, the Court appears to take the position that none of the factors are actual prerequisites to standing, and that these factors must instead be balanced. 3 8 In other decisions, however, the Court appears to
require that third party claimants meet each of the three factors before it
will allowjus tertii standing. 3 9 Against the background of this equivocal
Supreme Court precedent, the Third Circuit arranged the prudential
limitation factors into a cohesive framework for evaluating jus tertii
40
standing questions in Amato v. Wilentz.

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1988, the NewJersey state judiciary adopted a formal policy governing the use of state courthouses for commercial filmmaking. 4 1 This
policy required all judges to seek approval of the Chief Justice of the
New Jersey Supreme Court before consenting to any commercial use of
35. Id.
36. Id. at 623-24 n.3.

37. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972) (balancing variety
of factors but failing to indicate their relative weight); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)(same).
38. See, e.g.,
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 623 n.3. The Caplin Court held

that a lawyer had third party standing to raise the Sixth Amendment rights of his
client when challenging a statute that might have inhibited the client from paying his attorney's fees. Id. at 623 n.3, 624. The Court adopted a balancing approach and concluded that even though a criminal defendant suffers no serious
obstacles to advancing his or her own claim, the other two factors weighed
strongly enough to impart standing to the attorney. Id. at 624.
The Court has similarly held that the obstacle requirement is not necessary
in First Amendment overbreadth cases. See Secretary of State of Maryland v.
Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984) ("Although [failure to show an obstacle]
might defeat a party's standing outside the First Amendment context, this Court
has not found the argument dispositive in determining whether standing exists
to challenge a statute that allegedly chills free speech."); see also Virginia v.
American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (holding that no inquiry into potential obstacles to suit needed in granting standing to booksellers
to raise purchasers' First Amendment rights).
39. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991) (stating that "[w]e
have recognized the right oflitigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are satisfied" in upholding standing of litigant
to raise Equal Protection claims of jurors preemptorily challenged on racial
grounds).
40. 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991).
41. Amato, 952 F.2d at 744. Before 1988, no formal written policy existed,
but the ordinary practice was to request approval from the Chief Justice. Id.
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courthouses. 42 In April 1990, Chief Justice Wilentz permitted Warner
Brothers to film an "innocuous" scene for the movie Bonfire of the Vanities
43
in the Essex County Courthouse.
Later that month, Warner Brothers sought to film a riot scene for
the movie in the federal courthouse in Newark.4 4 The ChiefJustice denied the request on the basis that the scene depicted blacks "in the worst
possible stereotype," as "acting in a riotous, lawless and life-threatening
manner." 4 5 Warner Brothers then contacted Essex County officials and
agreed to donate $250,000 to the Essex County Courthouse Restoration
Fund for the right to film the riot scene at the courthouse. 46 Nonethe47
less, the Chief Justice again rejected Warner Brothers' request.
On May 16, 1990, Essex County brought an action against Chief
Justice Wilentz in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. 48
The county claimed that the ChiefJustice had violated the First Amendment rights of Warner Brothers by denying them access to film in New
42. Id. In 1989, the ChiefJustice approved seven of twelve filming requests
in state courthouses. Id.
43. Id. The Essex County Courthouse was built in the early 1900s and has
often been in demand for filmmaking because of its "classic beauty." Id. at 744
n.2. It has been used to film scenes from various movies, such as Rage of Angels,
Presumed Innocent, Jacob's Ladder, and She-Devil. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Warner Brothers then contacted several other New Jersey County
courthouses about filming the scene but, in each instance, the Chief Justice
turned down the requests. Id. The ChiefJustice based his denial of these filming requests on his belief that the proposed scene would " 'seriously undermine'
the black community's 'already vulnerable' confidence in the state judiciary." Id.
In the Bonfire scene, a predominantly black audience rioted in the courtroom
after the dismissal of an indictment of an upper-middle class white man accused
of running over a young black man with a car. Id.
46. Amato, 953 F.2d at 745. This donation was "far in excess of the
County's normal fees." Id.
47. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz also directed that an injunction be issued to
prevent filming of the Bonfire scene in the Essex County Courthouse. Id. The
injunction "proved unnecessary," however, because Warner Brothers decided
to film the Bonfire scene in New York instead. Id. The county thereafter obtained a hearing on the injunction before Judge Humphreys. Id. Despite Essex
County's argument that the Chief Justice's actions were "capable of repetition,
yet would evade review,"Judge Humphreys found the injunction issue moot. Id.
Following a public uproar, and complaints to the press from county executives,
the Chief Justice issued a public statement defending his actions. Id. Warner
Brothers then requested to film another Bonfire scene in the Essex County Courthouse in which the main character and the judge escape the rioting mob. Id. at
745-46. The Chief Justice directed Warner Brothers that they could only film
the non-riotous parts of the escape scene in the Essex County Courthouse. Id. at
746.
48. 753 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1990), vacated, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991).
The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory or injunctive
relief against Chief Justice Wilentz. Id. at 545. Specifically, Essex County
claimed that the Chief Justice acted under color of state law to deprive Warner
Brothers of its First Amendment rights. Id.
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Jersey courthouses. 4 9 In October 1990, the county moved for summary
judgment, and the Chief Justice cross-moved claiming inter alia that the
County lacked standing to raise its claims. 50 In December 1990, the district court ruled that Essex County had jus tertii standing to assert
Warner Brothers' First Amendment rights and entered a declaratory
judgment in favor of the county. 5 ' However, the district court found the
Chief Justice immune from any damage award, and the Chief Justice
"suspended all further commercial filmmaking in state courthouses."' 5 2
The Chief Justice and the county each filed cross-appeals to the Third
53
Circuit.

IV.

DiSCUSSION

On appeal to the Third Circuit, Chief Justice Wilentz contended
that Essex County lacked standing to raise its claims. 54 Specifically, the
49. Amato, 952 F.2d at 746. The day after this action was filed, the Chief
Justice created an advisory committee, who recommended that the state judiciary be removed from the decisionmaking process in filming requests, Id. Following the advisory committee's recommendations, the ChiefJustice instituted a
statewide nonjudicial committee to respond to filming requests. Id. The new
process included content guidelines which instructed the permit committee to
deny access to film in New Jersey Courthouses. Id.
50. Id. The Chief Justice also asserted that the county's damages claim
"was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and by immunity doctrines under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)," and that the county's declaratory and injunctive claims
were moot because filming of the movie was complete. Id. The Chief Justice
claimed in the alternative that his actions were not violative of the First Amendment. Id.
51. Amato, 753 F. Supp. at 549-51. The district court also ruled that the
county's claims were not moot because they were "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." Id. at 551-52. The district court proceeded to hold on the merits that the ChiefJustice violated Warner Brothers' First Amendment rights because the Essex County Courthouse was a "designated public forum" and the
ChiefJustice's "content-based" restrictions were not necessary to further a compelling state interest. Id. at 555-59. The district court further concluded even if
the courthouse was a non-public forum, the ChiefJustice's actions were still unconstitutional because they constituted viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 559-60.
Finally, the district court concluded that because the Chief Justice had not violated "clearly established law," he was entitled to qualified immunity from damages. Id. at 562.
52. Amato, 952 F.2d at 747.
53. Id. at 747. In their appeals, the ChiefJustice restated his claims before
the district court while the county argued that the district court erred in finding
the ChiefJustice immune from an award of damages. Id. In his first appeal, the
Chief Justice argued that qualified immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
barred the award of $41,000 in attorney's fees that the county sought. Id. Nonetheless, the district court approved the county's request in an unpublished opinion. Id. The Chief Justice's second appeal was consolidated with the earlier
appeals. Id.
54. Id. The Chief Justice based this assertion on the prudential limitations
on standing, and not upon any failure to meet Article III constitutional requirements for standing. Id. The county clearly met Article III requirements because
it 1) "allege[d] actual and threatened injury (loss of revenue)"; 2) "that is fairly
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Chief Justice argued that the only injury alleged by the county was a
violation of the First Amendment rights of Warner Brothers, who was
55
not a party to the case.
In resolving this issue, the Third Circuit began with the premise
thatjus tertii standing is exceptional, with the burden upon plaintiffs to
establish standing. 5 6 The Third Circuit then decided, based upon its
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, that "an overall balance of
factors [is] dispositive" in evaluating jus tertii standing.5 7 Specifically,
the court concluded that it must evaluate four predominant factors: (1)
obstacles to Warner Brothers' own suit; (2) the relationship between
Warner Brothers and Essex County and the consistency of their interests; (3) chilling effects unique to First Amendment litigation; and (4)
58
federalism concerns in the county versus state nature of the suit.
Upon balancing these factors, the Third Circuit held that Essex County's
interests were insufficient to overcome the initial bias against jus tertii
standing and thus held that the county lacked standing to assert Warner
59
Brothers' First Amendment rights.
A.

Obstacles to Warner Brothers' Own Suit

The Third Circuit first examined "whether obstacles blocked
'
Warner Brothers' own suit."60
The court preliminarily recognized that
the existence of an obstacle such as "a legal or physical inability to bring
suit" is a crucial factor in evaluatingjus tertii standing. 6 1 However, the
Third Circuit noted that "an impossibility of suit" is not necessary; on
traceable to the defendant's action"; and 3) "could be redressed by a favorable
decision on the merits." Id. For a discussion of the Article III constitutional
standing requirements, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975).
Counsel for Essex County described its basis for Article III standing as follows:
If Warner Brothers had not been deprived of its First Amendment right
to make this picture or scenes therefrom in the Old Essex County
Courthouse, the county treasury would have been enriched by something in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. That is our standing.
We want the money.
Amato, 952 F.2d at 747 n.5.
55. Amato, 952 F.2d at 747-48.
56. Id. at 750.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 750-55. For a discussion of the first factor, see infra notes 60-65
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the second factor, see infra notes 6680 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the third factor, see infra notes
81-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the fourth factor, see infra
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
59. Amato, 952 F.2d at 755.
60. Id. at 750.
61. Id.; see, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987) (holding that
Indian plaintiffs had standing to assert their decedents' rights because of physical inability as obstacle to decedent's suit). The Amato court recognized that in
Hodel, the "dead certainly could not assert their own rights." Amato, 952 F.2d at
750.
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the contrary, an "affirmative impediment" or perhaps even a mere
"practical disincentive to sue" might suffice to weigh in favor of conferring standing. 6 2 After deciding that there was "no legal impediment" to
Warner Brothers' suit, the Third Circuit addressed whether Warner
Brothers faced "practical disincentives to sue." 6 3 The court considered
as disincentives the time constraints faced by Warner Brothers in obtaining a filming location, and Warner Brothers' potential fear of a suit
resulting in a legal precedent that would deny filming requests based on
objectionable content of the scenes to be filmed. 64 The Third Circuit
concluded, however, that while Warner Brothers may have had "limited
practical incentive to sue," this factor was not strong enough to "weigh
significantly in favor" of conferring jus tertii standing upon Essex
65
County.
B.

The Relationship And Consistency of Interests Between Warner Brothers
and Essex County

The Third Circuit next considered whether the rights and interests
of Warner Brothers and Essex County were sufficiently consistent to
warrant jus tertii standing for the county. 66 According to the court, requiring a relationship between the parties assurqs that the plaintiff will
be an effective advocate of the right being asserted. 67 The court also
62. Amato, 952 F.2d at 750; see, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373
(1991). In Powers, the Court granted a litigant jus tertii standing to raise the
claims of a juror who was unconstitutionally excluded from a venire. Id. at 1373.
The Court indicated that the practical disincentives to the juror bringing his or
her own suit were "daunting," because the violation was not likely to recur and
because the juror's financial stake in the litigation was small relative to the costs
of the litigation. Id. The Powers Court thus opined that partly because the juror
"possess[es] little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights," a litigant would havejus teriii standing to assert the juror's
rights. Id.
Similarly, in Singleton v. Wulff, the Court held that doctors had standing to
raise the rights of their patients in challenging the constitutionality of a statute
restricting abortion funding. 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976). The Singleton Court
cited a woman's concern for privacy and the physical mootness of her case as
major practical obstacles or disincentives to bringing her own suit. Id. at 117.
The Court thus held that the doctors had jus tertii standing, even though such
obstacles were not insurmountable. Id.
63. Amato, 952 F.2d at 751.
64. Id. The Third Circuit recognized that the time restraints might constitute a disincentive to sue, and that the potential for adverse precedent to be
established may have been "a strategic reason not to sue." Id. at 751 n.9.
65. Id. at 751.

66. Id.
67. Id.; see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1976) (noting that "the
relationship between the litigant and the third party may be such that the former
is fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of the right as the latter" in
doctor-patient context); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991) (same in
litigant-juror context); Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 n.3
is one of special
(noting that "the attorney-client relationship ...
consequence").
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recognized that a close relationship of interests between the parties ensures that the parties share the same goals and that the third party's
rights will be adequately advanced. 68 Notwithstanding these observations, the Third Circuit adopted the position that the "intimacy of the
relationship" is not determinative in granting jus tertii standing. 69 The
court instead held that the essential components of this relationship factor are "a common link to the right asserted, consistency of the parties'
interests, and effective advocacy-not the intimacy of the relationship
7°
per se."
The Third Circuit then examined the Supreme Court's application
of the relationship factor in "market access" cases involving the vendorvendee relationship. 7 1 The Third Circuit noted that vendors have often
been granted third party standing to raise the rights of vendees who
have been denied access to the vendors' markets. 7 2 The Third Circuit
further recognized that the vendor-vendee relationships in the "market
access" cases were analogous to the "licensor-licensee" relationship be68. Amato, 952 F.2d at 751; see Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 849 (3d Cir.
1979) ("[Intimate relationships] provide strong circumstantial guarantees of
community of interest."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979).
69. Amato, 952 F.2d'at 752 (determining that "the relationship between the
third party and the plaintiff only counts insofar as it is linked to the right
asserted").
70. Id.; see Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991). In Powers, the
Supreme Court held that a litigant had standing to raise the rights of an excluded juror, even though the two had no personal or intimate relationship. Id.
at 1372-73. The Court reasoned that voir dire establishes a trust between the
juror and the litigant, and that the "common interest in eliminating racial discrimination" from the judicial system was sufficient to weigh in favor ofjus tertii
standing. Id.
71. Amato, 952 F.2d at 752.
72. Id.; see United States Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721
(1991) (granting attorney standing to bring action based on rights of client who
was deprived of legal representation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976)
(granting beer vendor standing to challenge statute prohibiting sale of beer to
males under age 21 and females under age 18); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
118 (1976) (granting physicians standing to raise claims of patients who were
denied medical funding for abortions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446
(1972) (granting distributor of contraceptives standing to raise rights of unmarried couple denied access to contraceptives).
In Amato, the Third Circuit stated that the vendee third party's "right to
buy" being asserted by the plaintiff is "inseparably linked with the vendor-vendee market relationship." Amato, 952 F.2d at 752. The Third Circuit also acknowledged the identity of interests between the vendor and the would-be
vendee, as well as the likelihood that the potential monetary benefit to the vendor from suing would ensure effective advocacy of the vendee's rights. Id. Consequently, the Third Circuit recognized that "[w]hen . . . enforcement of a
restriction against the litigant prevents a third party from entering into . relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship th6 third party has a legal entitlement (typically a constitutional
entitlement), third party standing has been held to exist." Id. (quoting United
States Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720 (1990)).
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tween Essex County and Warner Brothers." 7 3 Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit took the position that the market access cases were inapposite
because no requisite identity of interests existed between Warner Brothers and Essex County, which is a "critical assumption" underlying grants
ofjus tertii standing in market access cases.7 4 According to the Third
Circuit, Warner Brothers' and Essex County's interests "diverged... in
important ways." 7 5 Specifically, from the County's point of view, the
potential $250,000 award from winning the suit was worth the risk of
losing the suit, which would result in a ban on all future courthouse
filming. 7 6 From Warner Brothers' perspective, by contrast, the potential establishment of a legal precedent banning filming from a loss, combined with the likelihood of damaging the movie studio's already
tenuous relationship with the New Jersey Judiciary, outweighed any benefits of bringing the suit.7 7 The Third Circuit suggested that these differing perspectives amounted to a potential conflict 78of interest, which
weighed strongly against granting jus tertii standing.
The Third Circuit concluded that while Essex County would have
been an effective and vigorous advocate of its own interests, it would not
have served adequately Warner Brothers' interests. 79 Consequently, the
facThird Circuit held that the relationship and consistency of interests
80
standing.
tertii
ofjus
finding
a
of
favor
in
tor did not balance
C.

First Amendment "Chilling Effect" Considerations

The Third Circuit next focused on factors unique to First Amendment litigation. 8 1 The court preliminarily recognized that when First
Amendment issues are concerned, the Supreme Court "rather freely"
grantsjus tertii standing to a party to challenge a statute on overbreadth
grounds. 82 Accordingly, the Third Circuit considered the county's ar73. Amato, 952 F.2d at 752.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 753. The Third Circuit did concede, however, that Warner Brothers' ultimate goal of unlimited access to filming in courthouses was consistent
with the county's interest in maximizing revenue through courthouse filming.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Third Circuit added that Warner Brothers' decision not to sue
may not have been based only upon these limited incentives, but also upon skepticism about the legal merits or concerns about the costs and risks of litigation.
Id.
78. Id.; see Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1000 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that existence of true conflict of interest "weighs heavily against"
granting jus tertii standing); Frissell v. Rizzo, 597 F.2d 840, 848-49 (3d Cir.
1979) (recognizing that risk of conflict of interest is crucial factor weighing
against jus tertii standing), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 (1979).
79. Amato, 952 F.2d at 753.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-
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gument that the Chief Justice's decision would have a chilling effect on
other filmmakers considering filming similar controversial scenes in
83
courthouses in the future.
The Third Circuit ultimately rejected this argument, deciding that
the jus tertii standing principles in First Amendment overbreadth cases
were not controlling. 84 The Third Circuit first noted that the county
was not challenging a statute or regulation as in First Amendment over85
breadth challenges, but rather a specific ruling by the Chief Justice.
The Third Circuit then focused on the fact that the county was not seeking to protect the rights of filmmakers in general, but rather was seeking
to raise the rights of a single third party-Warner Brothers.8 6 Because
of these considerations, the Third Circuit deemed it fair to consider the
relationship, consistency of interests, and obstacle factors that may
otherwise be overlooked in First Amendment cases.8 7 Thus, the Third
Circuit concluded that while significant First Amendment issues existed,
they were not properly raised by the county's complaint, and therefore
were insufficient to weigh in favor of overriding the presumption against
88
jus tertii standing.
93 (1988) (holding that booksellers association had standing to bring action
based on First Amendment rights of potential purchasers); Secretary of State of
Maryland v. Munson, 467 U.S. 947, 956-59 (1984) (finding no prudential reasons to deny standing to professional fundraiser seeking to raise the First
Amendment rights of its charitable clients). Grants ofjus tertii standing in these
cases have been based upon the possibility that an overbroad statute will have a
"chilling effect" on the First Amendment rights of persons not before the court.
Amato, 952 F.2d at 753; see generally, Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine,
83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 853 (1970) (noting that overbreadth doctrine "emphasizes the need to eliminate an overbroad law's . . . 'chilling effect' ").

Denying

third party standing in such cases "would have an intolerable, inhibitory effect
on freedom of speech." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 n.5 (1972).
83. Amato, 952 F.2d at 754. Essex County conceded that this chilling effect
would be "geographically limited" to courthouses in New Jersey. Id. The
county noted, however, that from the time of the Chief Justice's decision, no
filmmakers sought permission to film scenes in New Jersey courthouses. Id.
Thus, the County argued that the chilling effect was "not merely theoretical, but
actually demonstrated," and that even limited-range chilling would "pose[] too
much of a threat to free expression." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Subsequent to this litigation, ChiefJustice Wilentz had instituted a
committee permit system containing policies that were subject to challenge on
First Amendment grounds, but the county chose not to object to this system. Id.
For a detailed discussion of this committee permit system, see supra note 49.
86. Amato, 952 F.2d at 754.
87. Id. For a further discussion of the relative weight of the prudential factors in First Amendment cases, see supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
88. Amato, 952 F.2d at 754. The Third Circuit stated that "if Essex or another county (or better, a filmmaker) had brought a challenge to the permit committee system, the overbreadth cases might well counsel in favor of according
third party standing." Id. (emphasis in original).
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The Federalism Factor

The Third Circuit concluded its analysis by considering the federalism concerns raised by the "county versus state" nature of the suit.8 9
The Chief Justice asserted that federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere in intrastate-government disputes and that a county
"is among the least appropriate" of all state representatives to bring
action against a state officer. 90 While the Third Circuit recognized that
this judicial reluctance "may be waning with time," 9 1 the court noted
92
that this common-law rule still controls absent a state waiver.
The Third Circuit noted that this federalism rule, which would deny
Essex County standing if it attempted to raise its own First Amendment
rights, was equally relevant to tip the "prudential balance" in jus tertii
standing cases against granting standing. 93 The Third Circuit thus emphasized that while it was "not endorsing a policy of federal court abstention from all suits between state governmental actors," it refused
to "wade into such frays enthusiastically," and "adjudicate them
' 94
unnecessarily.
Upon evaluating the overall balance of the factors involved-the minor obstacles facing Warner Brothers in bringing its own suit, the potential conflicts of interest between Warner Brothers and Essex County, the
inapplicability of special First Amendment considerations, the federalism concerns in discouraging intrastate governmental lawsuits, and the
exceptional status of third party standing, the Third Circuit concluded
that Essex County lacked jus tertii standing to raise Warner Brothers'
95
First Amendment rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

While a strong judicial policy against third party standing once ex96
isted, federal courts have slowly yet consistently abrogated that bias.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Bahimore, 289 U.S. 36,
40 (1932) (holding that counties, municipalities, and other subdivisions cannot
bring constitutional claims against their own state governments); Trustees of

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 660-61 (1819)
(same); City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039
(1980); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973)
(same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).

91. Amato, 952 F.2d at 755; see, e.g., Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057,
1067-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that school district was not precluded from
bringing action against state that created it), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
92. Amato, 952 F.2d at 755.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. For a discussion of the origin and growing tendency of courts to grant
jus tertii standing, see supra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
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However, courts have faced considerable uncertainty in Supreme Court
precedent as to the precise identity and weight of prudential limitation
factors that may be relevant or necessary in deciding whether to grant
97
jus tertii standing.
In Amato v. Wilentz, the Third Circuit resolved this confusion by definitively establishing the constitutional standards to be applied when
evaluating jus tertii standing problems.9 8 Undoubtedly, the Amato
court's analysis provides a useful and cohesive framework for determining the propriety of jus tertii standing. First, the Amato court emphasized that third party standing is exceptional and that the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to establish standing. 99 Second, the Third
Circuit identified the various factors relevant in evaluating jus tertii
standing and stated that an overall balancing of the factors is the appropriate approach.10 0 Finally, the Amato court provided a detailed demonstration of how these factors should be balanced in a case involving both
10 1
First Amendment and federalism issues.
Michael A. Frattone
97. For a discussion of the factors deemed relevant by courts in grantingjus
tertii standing, see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
98. For a discussion of the factors balanced by the Third Circuit, see supra

notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
99. Amato, 952 F.2d at 750.
100. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 57-95
and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of the First Amendment and federalism factors involved in the case, see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
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